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Abstract
We use correlations in the risk preferences of spouses as a testbed of whether pref-
erences are socially transmitted, rather than being innate as traditionally assumed
in economics. We obtain rich measurements of the risk preferences of cohabiting
spouses in the rural Ethiopian highlands. This allows us to use correlation coeﬃ-
cients at the level of the couple in regression analysis. We find a strong correlation
between the strength of the correlation in risk preferences within a couple and how
long a couple has been married. This provides direct evidence for assimilation in
the risk preference of spouses, and thus for social transmission of preferences. As-
sortative mating appears to be less important.
Keywords: risk preferences; transmission of preferences; gender eﬀects; household de-
cision making
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1 Introduction
Risk preferences play a fundamental role for almost all economic decisions. It may thus
seem all the more surprising that relatively little is known to date on how risk preferences
are determined. The lack of evidence on the determination of risk preferences may
be explained by a long-held view in economics that preferences are innate, and hence
unchangeable. This assumption is now increasingly being challenged in both empirical
and theoretical research (Booth and Nolen, 2012; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014; Klasing,
2014). We add to this debate by presenting direct evidence that the correlation in the
risk preferences of spouses is driven by assimilation, rather than by assortative mating.
While assortative mating is compatible with diﬀerent preference-determination mech-
anisms—including purely genetic transmission and ‘innate’ preferences—assimilation can
only be explained if preferences can change and react to social cues. Obtaining empirical
evidence on the determination of risk preferences is important for a number of reasons.
For instance, Galor and Michalopoulos (2012) presented a model in which risk prefer-
ences act as a driver of long-term growth processes through their role as determinants of
entrepreneurship. While the model takes no explicit position on how risk preferences are
determined, the mode of determination has important consequences for the speed with
which transitions between diﬀerent growth regimes may take place (for a discussion, see
Bouchouicha and Vieider, 2017). Other models assume directly that preferences can be
moulded through education—a view that is incompatible with (fully) innate preferences
(Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014; Klasing, 2014)
It has been known for some time that preferences are correlated within the family
(Charles and Hurst, 2003; Kimball, Sahm and Shapiro, 2009; Alan, Baydar, Boneva,
Crossley and Ertac, 2017). Cesarini, Dawes, Johannesson, Lichtenstein and Wallace
(2009) and Zhong, Chew, Set, Zhang, Xue, Sham, Ebstein and Israel (2009) presented
evidence of genetic transmission of risk preferences from parents to their children in twin-
studies. However, the estimated strength of the eﬀect diﬀers considerably between the
two studies, and the studies did not exclude cultural transmission as a mechanism acting
on top of and beyond any genetic factors. In a seminal paper, Dohmen, Falk, Huﬀman
and Sunde (2012) used a data set representative of the German population to show that
risk preferences are highly correlated within couples, as well as between parents and
children (see also Kimball et al., 2009). They concluded that such similarities in the
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couple were likely due to positive assortative mating, i.e. the selection of partners based
on similar risk preferences.
This conclusion was reached based on the observation that correlations in the risk
preference of spouses did not diﬀer between groups of couples that had been married for
diﬀerent lengths of time. Such a method may, however, suﬀer from several weaknesses.
For one, marriage usually follows several years of dating and cohabitation in the West,
and the initial years of a relationship may be particularly important when it comes to
the assimilation of preferences. There may also be selection issues at play, since people
who are particularly risk tolerant are likely to get married later, if at all, and may stay
married with a lower likelihood (Schmidt, 2008). Last but not least, the partition of
couples into diﬀerent subgroups does not allow for any controls to be added, so that
potential diﬀerences between groups may distort the picture.
We revisit the issue of how correlations in the risk preferences of spouses may be
explained using a diﬀerent approach. We obtain rich, incentivised measures of risk pref-
erences at the individual level (as well as survey measures aimed at replicating previous
results). This allows us to calculate a correlation coeﬃcient at the level of the couple,
which we can then regress on how long a couple has been together while controlling for
a number of potential confounding factors. We do this in a randomly selected sample of
couples of the rural Ethiopian highlands. Other than in most Western countries, couples
in Ethiopia do generally not cohabit before marriage, and divorce is virtually unheard
of, eliminating some potential confounds in Western data.
We start by replicating a number of results observed in the previous literature. We
find strong correlations in the couple using aggregate measures, which hold both with our
incentivised measures and using hypothetical survey measures employed in the previous
literature. We also obtain results indicating that risk preferences are similar for geo-
graphically proximate counterfactual couples—yet another factor indicative of cultural
transmission. We find no diﬀerence in the overall risk preferences of men and women
within our couples in our incentivised measures, which is consistent with recent evidence
showing that gender eﬀects may be dependant on subtle social clues (Booth and Nolen,
2012). We do, however, find a strong gender eﬀect based on the survey question, indicat-
ing that gender eﬀects may be task-dependent (Filippin and Crosetto, 2015). Regressing
the couple-level correlation coeﬃcient on the average age of the spouses, taken to be a
proxy for how long the couple has been married, we find a strong eﬀect indicating that
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the correlation increases in this indicator. This eﬀect is stable to inserting a number of
controls. We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of this finding.
2 Experimental setup and method
The data were collected in the context of a larger survey study collecting data from 1000
households in the wider Nile Basin in Ethiopia. The study area included four regions
of the Ethiopian highlands, in which twenty Woredas (administrative districts) were
selected in a stratified selection process based on representation of agro-climatic zones.
From each Woreda, 50 households were randomly selected from municipal household
lists. We then randomly selected 350 couples from all couples who took part in the
survey. Three couples could not be found at home after repeated visits, which leaves us
with a complete sample of 347 couples (694 individuals). All experiments and surveys
were run in May and June 2013.
Ethiopia has some characteristics that make it well suited for the investigation of our
topic. For one, couples typically start cohabiting only after marriage, which minimises
issues of previous cohabitation confounding findings. Divorce is virtually inexistent,
which excludes confounds deriving from higher divorce rates amongst poorly matched
couples. Marriage age is almost universally young, with a median marriage age of 16
years for women and of 24 years for men (ORC, 2006). This makes the average age in the
couple a good proxy for how long a couple has been married. Relatively little rural-to-
rural migration means that we can test for the similarity of preferences by geographical
proximity (Dercon and Porter, 2014; Di Falco and Bulte, 2013).
We elicit certainty equivalents (CEs) to measure risk preferences (Abdellaoui, Baillon,
Placido and Wakker, 2011; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2010; Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-
Rützler and Trautmann, 2013). CEs are easy to explain, and the sure amounts of
money to be used are naturally limited between the lower and upper amount of the
prospect. They are also amongst the simplest risk elicitation tasks one can conceive
of—a great advantage in developing countries, where a large part of the population is
illiterate or unaccustomed to abstract tasks (Vieider, Beyene, Bluﬀstone, Dissanayake,
Gebreegziabher, Martinsson and Mekonnen, 2016; Vieider, 2017).
Overall, we elicited 14 CEs per subject using binary prospects varying in probabilities
and outcomes. The design follows the one employed by Vieider, Lefebvre, Bouchouicha,
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Chmura, Hakimov, Krawczyk and Martinsson (2015) with students across 30 countries,
but we restricted ourselves only to known probabilities and gains due to time constraints
(the exact characteristics of the prospects can be gathered from table A in the appendix).
Every time a major change occurred in the decision tasks (e.g. a change in probabilities
or outcomes, or from gains to losses), the enumerator pointed out the change and gave
additional explanations of what this would involve. In the course of the explanation,
subjects were also shown bags containing numbered ping pong balls that would be used
for the random extraction, and were encouraged to examine their contents. This served
to make the decision problems more tangible and concrete.
The prospects were presented to subjects in a fixed order, whereby first 50-50 prospects
were presented in order of ascending expected value, and then the remaining prospects
were presented in order of increasing probability. The fixed order was kept so as to
make the task less cognitively demanding for subjects, since in the fixed ordering only
one element would change from one decision task to the next, which could be easily
pointed out by the enumerator. To test whether such a fixed ordering of tasks might
influence decisions, we ran a large-scale pilot involving 330 subjects.1 The pilot revealed
no diﬀerences between the fixed ordering used here and a random ordering.
CEs were elicited in individual interviews by a team of 20 enumerators. The enu-
merators were extensively trained before going to the field, and acquired experience by
running pilot experiments. The experiment was preceded by a careful explanation of
the decision tasks. Subjects were told that they would face choices between amounts of
money that could be obtained for sure and risky allocations. At the end, one of the tasks
would be extracted at random, and one of the choices between a sure amount and the
prospect would be played for real money (the standard procedure in this type of task).
A risk neutral decision maker stood to win the PPP-equivalent of e18—a substantial
sum in Ethiopia, corresponding to an income of about two weeks for the median partici-
pant. The experiments in the couple were generally run at the same time. First, the two
spouses were separated so that they could not see or hear each other’s decisions. Two
enumerators would then elicit the risk preferences of the spouses at the same time. The
payouts took place separately, and discretely out of sight from the spouse.
1The pilot was run in Vietnam at at Ho-Chi-Minh-City University as it was meant to inform a
number of experiments to be conducted with the same type of tasks. This also explains the large
number of subjects in the pilot, which were included to guarantee enough statistical power to make this
test meaningful.
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We also asked subjects about their willingness to take risks to obtain an alternative
measure of risk taking behaviour. The question has been validated by Dohmen, Falk,
Huﬀman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner (2011) for a representative sample of the German
population, and by Vieider et al. (2015) for an international sample of students across
30 countries (see also Hardeweg, Menkhoﬀ and Waibel, 2013, for a validation in a rural
population sample of Thailand). The question reads as follows:
How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks or do you try
to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale below, where 0 means “risk averse” and 10 means
“fully prepared to take risks”:
fully prepared
risk averse to take risks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
O O O O O O O O O O O
We normalise our CEs to make them more comparable across prospects. We use
⌧i =
cei yi
xi yi as a measure of risk tolerance, where xi is the high outcome in prospect i and
yi is the low outcome, so that xi > cei > yi. This makes sure that our measure is always
contained within the unit interval, which reduces distortions in the correlation analysis
due to diﬀerent ranges in the prospects. The normalised risk tolerance can be compared
directly to the probability of winning pi, with ⌧i > pi indicating risk seeking, ⌧i = pi risk
neutrality, and ⌧i < pi risk aversion.2
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive data and gender eﬀects
Descriptives of risk preferences are shown in figure 1, separately for the male household
heads and their spouses. To avoid informational overload, the graph shows only risk
tolerance for prospects resulting in either e20 or 0 PPP, by probability level (results for
other prospects are similar and can be found in the appendix). Both spouses display a
tendency towards risk seeking for most probabilities, as can be seen by directly comparing
2To see this, one can interpret our risk tolerance indicator ⌧ as a decision weight capturing nonlinear
transformations of probabilities under dual-expected utility (Yaari, 1987). Since utility is linear in that
setup, we can represent preferences over a given prospect i as cei = ⌧ixi+(1 ⌧i)yi. Solving this equation
for ⌧i then yields our risk tolerance index. Notice that since ⌧i is a decision weight attached to the best
outcome in the prospect, ⌧i > pi will now immediately indicate risk seeking. Notice also, however, that
we use this purely as a model-free index, and that diﬀerent normalizations do not substantively aﬀect
our results.
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the normalised risk tolerance to the probability of winning. Only for the prospect oﬀering
the largest probability of winning do we observe slight risk aversion. This corresponds
to previous evidence from the Ethiopian highlands obtained by Vieider et al. (2016).
It amounts to a generalisation to the overall trends found in international comparisons
using student data (L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016), which found students from poorer
countries to be systematically more risk tolerant than students from rich countries.
Figure 1: Risk premia by prospect and gender, for (20, pi; 0)
We detect no diﬀerence in risk tolerance between spouses taking the average of the
14 indices of risk tolerance (z = 1.584, p = 0.113; signed-rank test). In individual
prospects there are no diﬀerences between spouses up to and including a probability of
0.5. For larger probabilities, however, women are somewhat more risk averse than their
husbands (statistics and tests for all the prospects can be found in appendix A). This
corresponds to findings in structural models showing that gender eﬀects may interact
with the probability of winning in a prospect, rather than having a uniform eﬀect on
risk preferences (L’Haridon and Vieider, 2016). It is also consistent with recent evidence
from a large meta-analysis showing that gender eﬀects may be weak or non-existent
when measured in multiple choice lists (Filippin and Crosetto, 2015). The results show
that gender eﬀects may vanish once one keeps the economic background characteristics
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constant. Comparing male and female household heads in Ethiopia, Vieider et al. (2016)
found large diﬀerences, which are likely driven by the economic vulnerability of female
household heads.
Our findings stand in marked contrast to those of Dohmen et al. (2012), who found
strong gender eﬀects within the couple, with women more risk averse than men. To
determine whether the diﬀerence in findings is due to the diﬀerences in tasks or diﬀerences
in subject pools, we further examine the gender eﬀect in terms of self-declared willingness
to take risks. We find a significant correlation between our average incentivised measure
and self-declared willingness to take risk for both men (⇢ = 0.235, p < 0.001; Spearman
rank correlation) and women (⇢ = 0.182, p < 0.001). Other than for our incentivised
measures, self-declared willingness to take risks is significantly lower for women than
for men (z = 3.425, p < 0.001, signed-rank test). The diﬀerence with the findings of
Dohmen et al. (2012) thus appears to derive from the task used rather than from the
subject sample.
3.2 Correlation analysis using aggregate measures
We start by examining aggregate risk preferences, using the simple mean of the 14 risk
tolerance measures per subject. The correlations we find within the couple are relatively
strong, with Pearson’s r = 0.498, p < 0.001 (we use Pearson correlations inasmuch as
we are interested in absolute similarities beyond ranks; all results are stable if we use
Spearman correlations instead). Kimball et al. (2009) reported a correlation in the couple
of 0.41 based on a hypothetical task gauging risk taking in labor markets. Dohmen et al.
(2012) found a correlation of 0.34 in a representative sample of the German population
using the survey question on general willingness to take risks. Our measure, being a
mean of several CEs, is likely less aﬀected by noise than either of those measures. It
also has a finer resolution. Using the qualitative scale instead, we find a correlation of
r = 0.335, p < 0.001, which is almost identical to the one in the German sample.
We next explore the measure for the 120,062 counterfactual couples obtained by
pairing all household heads with all spouses but their own. This allows us to establish a
baseline, and to rule out that correlations in our aggregate measure are purely driven by
mechanical factors. We would expect the correlations for these artificial pairings to be
zero on average, which is indeed what we find: r =  0.001, p = 0.566 (the same holds
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for the willingness to take risk question: r =  0.001, p = 0.748). This serves to reassure
us that the correlation we found above was indeed genuine.
Having established this benchmark, we can now further explore the correlations by
subgroups of the counter-factual couples. We start from the regional level. We have four
regions in our sample, Tigray (64 couples), Amhara (80 couples), Oromiya (157 couples),
and SNNP (43 couples). Including only counterfactual pairings with both spouses from
the same region (N = 33, 118), we obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of r = 0.116, p < 0.001.
If we further reduce our geographical focus to the level of the Kebele (an administrative
district; N = 12, 374), the correlation further increases to r = 0.234, p < 0.001. The
smallest administrative level in our data is the Got, or village level. If we only consider
counterfactual couples at this level (N = 2, 480), the correlation further increases to
r = 0.261, p < 0.001. This provides a first, albeit very indirect, indication that risk
preferences may be subject to socially driven assimilation.
3.3 Determinants of within-couple correlations
The next step will be to investigate the determinants of the correlations in real couples.
To this end, we calculate correlation coeﬃcients at the level of the couple. Table 1
shows a regression of our 347 correlation coeﬃcients on background characteristics of
the couple. We are most interested in age, which is taken to be the average age of the
couple, and normalised to be 0 for the youngest couple in our sample. At 20.5 years,
the average age of the youngest couple is indeed almost identical to the statistical age of
the median Ethiopian couple (ORC, 2006). We take this variable to serve as a proxy for
how long a couple has been married, since we do not have direct data on this. In case of
assortative mating, we would expect there to be no eﬀect of age on the correlation. If, on
the other hand, the correlation is due to assimilation, then we would expect a positive
correlation with average age.
Regression I shows that age has a strong positive eﬀect on the correlation of risk
preferences between spouses. Regression II adds age squared to look for non-linear
eﬀects, but finds none. Regression III further adds the age diﬀerence in the couple, which
also shows no eﬀects. Finally, regression IV adds land size (which serves as an income
proxy—see Vieider et al., 2016, for a detailed discussion of this issue for Ethiopia), and
a variable capturing the diﬀerence in literacy within the couple. These controls serve the
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purpose of determining whether it is purely income eﬀects that drive similarities in the
risk preferences of couples over time. None of these variables shows an eﬀect, indicating
that the correlations are not purely driven by income eﬀects. The age eﬀect remains
strong and highly significant throughout. The eﬀect is also stable to using the age of
either spouse instead of the average age in the couple.
Table 1: Regressions of correlation coeﬃcients, real couples
I II III IV
mean age norm 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
mean age sqr -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
age diﬀ 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
land size -0.037
(0.025)
literacy diﬀ -0.006
(0.029)
constant 0.313*** 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.297***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.067)
N 345 345 345 323
R2 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.041
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The average age variable used is normalised such that the youngest couple in our
data set corresponds to 0. The constant in regression I may thus be interpreted as the
correlation found for the youngest couple in our data, which presumably got married very
recently. At 0.313, that value is not much larger than the correlation found for coun-
terfactual couples from the same administrative district or Kebele, which is r = 0.310.3
Indeed, the two are not significantly diﬀerent at conventional levels (z = 1.641, p =
0.101, N = 12, 180). This seems to indicate that assortative mating does not play a
strong role in our sample to start with.
One may be concerned about diﬀerential age eﬀects on risk preferences for men and
women. Such diﬀerential age eﬀects may conceivably push the preferences of spouses
to resemble each other increasingly over time, without this eﬀect being due to true
assimilation. To rule out such eﬀects, table 2 shows separate regressions of risk attitudes
on age and other characteristics for the household head and spouse separately. Neither
age nor being literate show any eﬀects in regression I. Regression II adds land size as
a proxy for income. Risk tolerance is strongly increasing in land owned, in accordance
3The couple-level correlations are higher than the aggregate correlations discussed above. This de-
rives from the fact that the lotteries employed have certain chracteristics that produce a positive base
correlation due to both mechanical and behavioural factors.
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with most previous evidence.4 Finally, we add steepness of the land and total wealth as
additional controls. Steepness usually lowers the productivity of land in the Ethiopian
highlands, and we find the expected negative eﬀect on risk tolerance. Wealth shows no
significant eﬀect. Notwithstanding these significant correlates, the variance explained in
the regression remains very low—large amounts of unexplained heterogeneity are indeed
the norm for risk preferences (von Gaudecker, van Soest and Wengström, 2011). Most
importantly, however, the predictors are perfectly aligned for the spouses, making purely
mechanical causes for correlations unlikely.
Table 2: Regressions of risk tolerance, HHs and spouses
I II III
HH SP HH SP HH SP
age -0.004 -0.019 -0.009 -0.024 -0.009 -0.025
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
literate 0.030 0.031 0.023 0.026 0.014 0.021
(0.029) (0.035) (0.028) (0.037) (0.028) (0.037)
land size 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.052***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
steep -0.493*** -0.376***
(0.093) (0.091)
total wealth 0.016 0.001
(0.012) (0.018)
constant 0.640*** 0.631*** 0.642*** 0.630*** 0.651*** 0.635***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
N 342 327 336 321 336 321
R2 0.005 0.010 0.061 0.048 0.099 0.068
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4 Conclusion
Risk preferences have been found to be highly correlated within the couple, as well as
between parents and children. What drives such correlations promises to shed light
on the determinants of risk preferences more in general. Genetic explanations might
suggest that preferences are innate (Cesarini et al., 2009). Such an account would also be
consistent with positive assortative mating within the couple. By showing direct evidence
for the assimilation of risk preferences within the couple, we posit that risk preferences
can change over time and adapt to changing circumstances. This is consistent with
accounts showing the dependence of risk preferences on subtle social clues (Booth and
4There exists a sprawling literature on the correlation between income or wealrth and risk aversion.
Although economists generally expect an eﬀect in the direction of risk aversion declining in income, this
relationship is less well-established empirically than one might think. See Hopland, Matsen and Strøm
(2013) and ? for a discussion.
11
Nolen, 2012; Booth, Cardona-Sosa and Nolen, 2014). The results thus support theories
that rely on quick transitions in risk preferences between generations, with preferences
either consciously instilled by parents into children to adapt to economic circumstances
(Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014; Klasing, 2014), or transmitted culturally with potential
tipping points accelerating the spread.
Our conclusion of assimilation being the main driver of the correlation of risk prefer-
ences in the couple departs from the conclusions reached in previous studies. In particu-
lar, Dohmen et al. (2012) concluded that the correlation of risk preferences found within
couples is due to assortative mating. They based this conclusion on splitting their sample
into sub-samples that had been married for relatively short and for much longer periods,
and then compared the correlation coeﬃcients. They concluded that the coeﬃcients were
very similar, taking this as evidence for assortative mating. Reanalysing the same data
and using the same technique of splitting the sample into diﬀerent age groups, but using
diﬀerent econometric techniques accounting for errors, Bacon, Conte and Moﬀatt (2014)
found some evidence for correlations increasing in years of marriage. They nevertheless
concluded that positive assortative mating was the main factor underlying correlations
in the risk preferences of couples.
The diﬀerence in our results may stem from a number of factors. For one, even re-
cently married couples may have been together and may have cohabited for long periods
in Germany. The same is very unlikely to be true in Ethiopia. Furthermore, simply com-
paring correlations in two diﬀerent groups is a relatively coarse method for determining
potential eﬀects of assimilations, as the groups may diﬀer along other dimensions that
cannot be controlled for. We can directly estimate the eﬀect of years of marriage (as
proxied by average age in the couple) on the couple-level correlation coeﬃcient. This is
clearly a much more powerful method, given how it allows for a much finer determination
of the eﬀect of marriage time on correlation coeﬃcients, wile simultaneously inserting
controls into the regression. Nevertheless, further corroboration of these results using
diﬀerent methods seems highly desirable.
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A Comparison of risk premia in the couple by prospect
Table 3: Summary measures of aggregate risk preferences by prospect
p x y cei yixi yi HHs
cei yi
xi yi spouses Ranksum test
0.50 40 0 0.712 0.726 z =  0.298, p = 0.765
0.50 80 0 0.671 0.665 z = 1.129, p = 0.259
0.50 160 0 0.627 0.622 z = 0.781, p = 0.435
0.50 240 0 0.595 0.591 z = 1.217, p = 0.223
0.50 240 80 0.591 0.575 z = 0.936, p = 0.334
0.50 240 160 0.621 0.632 z =  0.735, p = 0.462
0.125 160 0 0.306 0.296 z = 0.956, p = 0.339
0.125 160 40 0.653 0.650 z = 0.470, p = 0.638
0.250 160 0 0.562 0.548 z = 1.028, p = 0.304
0.375 160 0 0.616 0.592 z = 1.680, p = 0.093
0.625 160 0 0.727 0.678 z = 2.833, p = 0.005
0.750 160 0 0.776 0.745 z = 1.912, p = 0.056
0.875 160 0 0.827 0.793 z = 2.084, p = 0.037
0.875 160 40 0.822 0.791 z = 1.964, p = 0.049
mean 0.652 0.635 z = 1.584, p = 0.113
13
References
Abdellaoui, Mohammed, Aurélien Baillon, Lætitia Placido, and Peter P. Wakker (2011)
‘The Rich Domain of Uncertainty: Source Functions and Their Experimental Imple-
mentation.’ American Economic Review 101, 695–723
Alan, Sule, Nazli Baydar, Teodora Boneva, Thomas F. Crossley, and Seda Ertac (2017)
‘Transmission of risk preferences from mothers to daughters.’ Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 134, 60–77
Bacon, Philomena M., Anna Conte, and Peter G. Moﬀatt (2014) ‘Assortative mating on
risk attitude.’ Theory and Decision 77(3), 389–401
Booth, Alison L., and Patrick Nolen (2012) ‘Gender diﬀerences in risk behaviour: does
nurture matter?’ The Economic Journal 122(558), F56–F78
Booth, Alison, Lina Cardona-Sosa, and Patrick Nolen (2014) ‘Gender diﬀerences in risk
aversion: Do single-sex environments aﬀect their development?’ Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 99, 126–154
Bouchouicha, Ranoua, and Ferdinand M. Vieider (2017) ‘Growth, Entrepreneurship, and
Risk Tolerance: A risk-income paradox.’ University of Reading Working Paper
Bruhin, Adrian, Helga Fehr-Duda, and Thomas Epper (2010) ‘Risk and Rationality:
Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion.’ Econometrica 78(4), 1375–1412
Cesarini, David, Christopher T. Dawes, Magnus Johannesson, Paul Lichtenstein, and
Björn Wallace (2009) ‘Genetic Variation in Preferences for Giving and Risk Taking.’
Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(2), 809–842
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Erik Hurst (2003) ‘The Correlation of Wealth Across Gener-
ations.’ Journal of Political Economy 111(6), 1155–1182
Dercon, Stefan, and Catherine Porter (2014) ‘Live Aid Revisited: Long-Term Impacts
of the 1984 Ethiopian Famine on Children.’ Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 12(4), 927–948
Di Falco, Salvatore, and Erwin Bulte (2013) ‘The Impact of Kinship Networks on the
Adoption of Risk-Mitigating Strategies in Ethiopia.’ World Development 43, 100–110
Doepke, Matthias, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2014) ‘Culture, Entrepreneurship, and
Growth.’ In ‘Handbook of Economic Growth,’ vol. 2
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huﬀman, and Uwe Sunde (2012) ‘The Inter-
generational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes.’ Review of Economic Studies
14
70(2), 645–677
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huﬀman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G.
Wagner (2011) ‘Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, and Behav-
ioral Consequences.’ Journal of the European Economic Association 9(3), 522–550
Filippin, Antonio, and Paolo Crosetto (2015) ‘A Reconsideration of Gender Diﬀerences
in Risk Attitudes.’ Management Science, forthcoming
Galor, Oded, and Stelios Michalopoulos (2012) ‘Evolution and the Growth Process:
Natural Selection of Entrepreneurial Traits.’ Journal of Economic Theory 147(2), 759–
780
Hardeweg, Bernd, Lukas Menkhoﬀ, and Hermann Waibel (2013) ‘Experimentally Val-
idated Survey Evidence on Individual Risk Attitudes in Rural Thailand.’ Economic
Development and Cultural Change 61(4), 859–888
Hopland, Arnt O., Egil Matsen, and Bjarne Strøm (2013) ‘Income and choice under
risk.’ Working Paper Series 14313, Department of Economics, Norwegian University
of Science and Technology
Kimball, Miles S., Claudia R. Sahm, and Matthew D. Shapiro (2009) ‘Risk Preferences
in the PSID: Individual Imputations and Family Covariation.’ American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings 99(2), 363–368
Klasing, Mariko J. (2014) ‘Cultural change, risk-taking behavior and implications for
economic development.’ Journal of Development Economics 110, 158–169
L’Haridon, Olivier, and Ferdinand M. Vieider (2016) ‘All over the map: Heterogene-
ity of risk preferences across individuals, contexts, and countries.’ EM-DP2016-04,
University of Reading
ORC, Macro (2006) Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:
Central Statistical Agency)
Schmidt, Lucie (2008) ‘Risk preferences and the timing of marriage and childbearing.’
Demography 45(2), 439–460
Sutter, Matthias, Martin G Kocher, Daniela Glätzle-Rützler, and Stefan T Trautmann
(2013) ‘Impatience and Uncertainty: Experimental Decisions Predict Adolescents’
Field Behavior.’ American Economic Review 103(1), 510–531
Vieider, Ferdinand M. (2017) ‘Certainty Preference, Random Choice, and Loss Aver-
sion: A Comment on "Violence and Risk Preference: Experimental Evidence from
15
Afghanistan".’ American Economic Review, forthcoming
Vieider, Ferdinand M., Abebe Beyene, Randall A. Bluﬀstone, Sahan Dissanayake, Zenebe
Gebreegziabher, Peter Martinsson, and Alemu Mekonnen (2016) ‘Measuring risk pref-
erences in rural Ethiopia.’ Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming
Vieider, Ferdinand M., Mathieu Lefebvre, Ranoua Bouchouicha, Thorsten Chmura, Rus-
tamdjan Hakimov, Michal Krawczyk, and Peter Martinsson (2015) ‘Common compo-
nents of risk and uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from
30 countries.’ Journal of the European Economic Association 13(3), 421–452
von Gaudecker, Hans-Martin, Arthur van Soest, and Erik Wengström (2011) ‘Hetero-
geneity in Risky Choice Behaviour in a Broad Population.’ American Economic Review
101(2), 664–694
Yaari, Menahem E. (1987) ‘The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk.’ Econometrica
55(1), 95–115
Zhong, Songfa, Soo Hong Chew, Eric Set, Junsen Zhang, Hong Xue, Pak C. Sham,
Richard P. Ebstein, and Salomon Israel (2009) ‘The Heritability of Attitude Toward
Economic Risk.’ Twin Research and Human Genetics 12(1), 103–107
16
